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The Eastern Partnership – 
“ENP plus” for Europe’s Eastern neighbors
The initial idea for the Eastern Partnership (EaP) was
set out almost four years ago and was based on the
notion that if the addressed countries were to at
least formally be ready to join the EU in 10 to 15
years, some EU instrument more effective than the
rather technical European Neighbourhood Policy
(ENP) ought to be launched. This initial approach
evolved into the EaP through a joint Polish-Swedish
proposal, which was introduced at the General
Affairs and External Relations Council in Brussels on
May 26th, 2008, and was followed by a communica-
tion from the European Commission to the
European Parliament and the Council. The EaP was
formally launched on March 20th, 2009, during the
Brussels European Council to
complement the already exist-
ing regional initiatives of the
Northern Dimension, covering
the Nordic countries, the Baltic
states, and Russia, as well as the
Union for the Mediterranean, of which all EU mem-
ber states and the non-EU countries that border the
Mediterranean Sea are participants. Thus, the EaP is
also in a way meant to counterbalance the Union for
the Mediterranean. Among other things it will pro-
vide new association agreements, including deep
and comprehensive free-trade agreements with the
EU, assistance to improve the administrative capaci-
ty of the addressed countries in order to enhance the
fight against corruption, organized crime and illegal
migration, and closer cooperation in the field of
energy in order to enhance energy security between
the EU and the countries covered by the EaP. As an
important incentive, visa-free travel is intended as a
long-term goal. Thus, the EaP goes in some aspects
beyond the already existing framework of the ENP.
No added value for the ENP states?
Some criticism, however, remains, particularly from
Ukraine, which already has bilateral agreements
with the EU covering most of the aforementioned
issues. Particularly in the field of establishing a free
trade area and visa policy, Kiev argues that the EaP
does not provide any added value in comparison to
the negotiations that are already conducted between
the European Union and Ukraine. Furthermore, all
other EaP countries already have separate Partner-
ship and Cooperation agreements (PCA) with the
EU, except for Belarus. Therefore the question
remains why the EU proposes a new initiative to put
all those countries into one
basket instead of trying to pur-
sue deeper integration individ-
ually, as it was pursued in the
case of Ukraine so far. Further-
more, other regional initiatives
in the EU’s Eastern neighborhood already exist. Five
of the six EaP countries are already participating in
the Commission’s Black Sea Synergy (BSS) that was
just launched in April 2007. The only country not
included is Belarus because of geographical reasons
among other things. However, in the latest progress
report on the BSS, it is stated that Belarus could be
included ”in some BSS activities at technical level”.
In contrast to the European Partnership, one big
advantage of the BSS is that both big regional actors,
the Russian Federation and Turkey, are included. As
the program seeks to increase cooperation between
the countries surrounding the Black Sea, a multi-
lateral dimension is certainly necessary.
“The EaP is to complement the al-
ready existing regional initiatives and
to counterbalance the Union for the
Mediterranean.”
On May 7th, 2009, the European Union’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) is going to be launched at a summit in Prague.
The current Czech council presidency will host representatives from all EU member states as well as from Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Russia objects the EaP, accusing the EU of trying to widen its
sphere of influence in the region. While the European Union should try to disperse these concerns it should also more
strongly address other political issues in the neighborhood, particularly in order to support stabilization processes.
Thus, the Eastern Partnership should not become just another regional initiative without further surplus.
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In the initial proposal for the EaP, at least the
Russian exclave of Kaliningrad was mentioned as a
potential partner. However, the Russian participa-
tion is no longer present in the final document. Not
surprisingly, the Russian foreign minister Lavrov
accused the EU of trying to widen its sphere of
influence through the EaP. Even if the Commission
tries to emphasize that the EaP is not an initiative
against Russia, the question has to be asked why the
EU sets up a new framework that explicitly excludes
Russia, but to some extent duplicates the already
existing EU initiatives in the Black Sea region.
Different map of interests in the EU
Among the problems prior to the EaP’s launch was
the financial configuration of the program. The
Commission has proposed a funding of 600 million
Euros for the period 2010-2013. 250 million will be
refocused from the ENP regional east program. The
provision of the additional 350
million have, however, caused
frictions between the EU mem-
ber states that have a strong
interest in the southern neigh-
bors, e.g. France, Italy, and
Spain, and those that are fo-
cusing more on the Eastern neighborhood. Where
this funding comes from is very vaguely described in
the final document of the EaP: “Increased financial
support in line with the Commission’s proposal of
600 million Euros for the time period until 2013 will
respect the resources available under the multi-
annual financial framework, including adequate
margins”. Or, in other words: Additional 350 million
Euros yes, but probably not from the framework and
not at the cost of those countries that are addressed
in the framework of the Union for the Mediterra-
nean. It is, however, not only the financial configu-
ration of the EaP that reveals the different maps of
interests between the EU member states. A EU
membership perspective for the countries covered
by the EaP for 2020 or later was not ruled out in the
Polish-Swedish initiative. Warsaw is certainly inter-
ested in the EU membership of its Eastern neigh-
bors, particularly Ukraine, and Stockholm is tradi-
tionally among the enlargement advocates. How-
ever, after a continuing downgrading of the initiative
during the negotiations, the word EU membership
was carefully avoided in the final conclusion of
March 2009. This has of course to do with the in-
creasing enlargement fatigue in Western Europe.
While “downgrading” is a common practice in the
EU policy-making process in order to find a com-
promise between the member states, the exclusion
of the membership perspective also decreases the
EU’s potential leverage on the region. However, if
the visa facilitation process will actually be im-
proved, it can be considered as a strong incentive for
the EaP countries to participate in the program.
Nevertheless, this deeper cooperation can moreover
be achieved if Russia is involved in the program.
Even if the Russian fear of being circumvented
seems absurd to many EU member states it needs to
be respected. On the other hand, Moscow needs to
understand that a stable and economically pros-
perous region is in its own interest, and therefore
closer cooperation in the shared neighborhood with
the EU is not directed against Russia, but beneficiary
for all parties involved.
Launch of the EaP in an unfavorable time 
But current developments
seem to make these sugges-
tions rather a third or fourth
step than a second one after
the launch of the EaP. It is no
longer Belarus or the Russian
Federation who appear as the troublemakers for the
EU. Mass protests in Moldova after the parliamen-
tary elections on April 5th, 2009, have destabilized
the country and directly affect one EU member state.
Romania has been accused of heating-up the situa-
tion after the elections. The democratic revolution in
Georgia that helped president Michail Saakashwili
to be elected to office could now potentially get him
out of office again. Thousands of opposition mem-
bers gathered in the streets of Tbilisi on April 9th.
And the political spectacle in Ukraine ushers in the
next act as the parliament called for early presiden-
tial elections on April 1st. Thus, some countries are in
a process of destabilization in the coming months
and at the time of the Prague summit. On the other
hand, the constitutional amendments of March give
Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliev the chance for an
unlimited presidency, which might turn out as a bit-
ter setback for the democratization process in Baku.
In addition to that, the EU itself suffers not only
from the financial crisis but also currently from a
lack of leadership. On March 24th the Czech prime
minister and current holder of the EU presidency
had to resign after he lost the fourth vote of no con-
fidence against his government, which means that
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the host of the summit to launch the EaP is no lon-
ger the real host but the servant. He will hand over
duties to the interim Prime Minister Jan Fischer only
two days after the summit.
Addressing frozen conflicts
Although the Eastern Partnership already addresses
political issues in the EU’s neighborhood more
strongly than the ENP, the Union does not really
focus on conflict resolution in the south Caucasus,
i.e. in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria, and
Nagorno-Karabakh. Much depends in this respect
on the influence the EU can gain in the region. For a
lack of leverage, the EU is hard-
ly able to mediate in the conflict
resolution process between
Georgia and South Ossetia and
Abkhazia, respectively Russia.
This was demonstrated at the
rather unsuccessful round of
the Geneva peace talks in March 2009. In contrast,
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which has since the
1990s mainly been conducted by the OSCE Minsk
Group but was indirectly supported by the EU,
might be easier to address. Just recently, US presi-
dent Barack Obama noted that the conflict has been
too protracted and that Turkey might play a con-
structive role in the resolution. In November 2008,
the Russian government was able to mediate a joint
declaration between Armenia and Azerbaijan to
continue their work on a political settlement of the
conflict, which was welcomed in Ankara. Those are
signs for more international commitment to the
resolution of the conflict.
Recommendations
Although the European Union is facing many diffi-
culties at home and its near abroad, the Eastern
Partnership has nevertheless the potential to be-
come a real “ENP plus”. In order to achieve this,
some points should be taken into account:
1. The EU needs to accept that Russia has a fear of
being circumvented by other states. The reply by the
Swedish government to the statement of Russian
foreign minister Lavrov that those comments are
absolutely unacceptable is certainly counterproduc-
tive for the EU, Russia, and their shared neighbor-
hood and should be avoided in the future. Russia
needs to be ensured that the EU’s aim is not to cir-
cumvent Russia, but that the EU also has specific
interests in its neighborhood. Policies to address the
region should therefore become more cooperative
from both sides in the future. As an example, the
Russian government could presently endanger the
EaP by either influencing the governments of the
EaP partners not to join the initiative, or by further
destabilizing the region. Having only one country
not participating would destroy the core idea behind
the EaP, namely closer cooperation with all partners
in the region. In order to achieve this, the EU needs
to involve the Russian Federation in the process of
the EaP, for example by a stronger exchange of infor-
mation or even by inviting Russia as an observer to
the EaP.
2. The conflict between Georgia
and Russia of August 2008 has
proven that a strong EU presi-
dency can have influence on its
near abroad. That does not
mean that only big member
states like France can achieve success for the Union
in external relations. However, the current political
situation in the Czech Republic makes it difficult for
the EU to convince the countries in its neighbor-
hood to be effective stakeholders in the region. In
order to ensure the success of the EaP from the
beginning, the next EU presidency, Sweden, should
become involved in the implementation of the pro-
gram as soon as possible. It should also ensure that
the EU speaks with one voice in the EaP. Although it
is only natural for a community of 27 different states
to have different maps of interest this should not
lead to division within the EU. Regional programs
only make sense if every EU member country backs
them in equal measure. That means that the Union
for the Mediterranean is equally important as the
Eastern Partnership, and funding for the EaP should
not be at the expense of the southern neighbors. But
without clear commitments on how both projects
will be funded, the basis for neither of the two is
very solid.
3. EU membership ambitions by Georgia and
Armenia, and to a lesser extent also by Azerbaijan,
give the Union some political leverage on all three
countries. This is complemented by the more “tech-
nical”and thus – from a political perspective – rather
limited Commission instruments of the ENP, the
Eastern Partnership, and the Black Sea Synergy. The
EU should use this increasing political influence in
order to address the frozen conflicts in the region by
starting with the conflict resolution in Nagorno-
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hardly able to mediate in the conflict
resolution process between Georgia
and South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
respectively Russia.”
Karabakh. In addressing it, the EU should closely
cooperate with the Russian and Turkish govern-
ments, who are unlikely to act as “spoilers” to the
process. As the chances are good that the US
government will support this attempt, the conflict
resolution could be pursued with a truly multilateral
approach. The EU should not remain a bystander but
an active participant in this process. If all parties
succeed in effectively supporting conflict resolution
in Nagorno-Karabakh, the EU could furthermore
become involved in addressing other frozen conflicts
on which it has, contrary to Russia, only minimal
leverage so far. This is also an ending in itself:
Existing conflicts in the south Caucasus threaten not
only the region, but also the EU and undermine its
policies. A successful resolution of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict is, for example, expected to lead to
a further democratization of Azerbaijan and
Armenia. As a potential energy supplier – with re-
spect to Azerbaijan’s energy resources and the
region as an energy transit corridor – the EU should
be highly interested in a viable solution.
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